Arkansas Game and Fish Commission v. US: Intentional Flooding & Judicial Power

A week or so ago, Ronald Rotunda wrote a brief piece looking at Supreme Court cases in which the Solicitor General’s position had been unanimously rejected by the Court. The Solicitor General represents the Government in Supreme Court litigation. It’s an interesting list, and well worth reading through. What caught my eye, however, was that the first case he describes is the takings case, Arkansas Game and Fish Commission v. United States decided by the US Supreme Court in 2012 (568 US __ (2012); see the Oyez.org page here for more details about the case. My citations below reference the Supreme Court’s Slip Opinion).

The case involved a forested area owned by the Arkansas Game and Fish Commission that was periodically flooded by the US Army Corps of Engineers. The repeated, temporary flooding damaged the trees and affected peak timber growing season. The Arkansas Commission filed a takings claim against the US Army Corps of Engineers. They claimed that the area had been damaged permanently by the Corps’ program of intentional flooding, and therefore the Commission was due compensation for their losses.

In her opinion, Justice Ginsburg points out that not only did the flooding adversely effect the growing season for the valuable trees; it changed the character of the terrain substantially. Those changes, she said, caused the state to engage in costly reclamation measures. While the case was remanded for further review (including investigating some claims made by the Government that had not been fully contemplated by lower courts), Justice Ginsburg made a very clear point in her opinion – and again, a unanimous decision – there is no “blanket temporary-flooding exception” in takings clause jurisprudence.

Why was it necessary for the Court to take a firm stand on this point? There was a precedent from 1924 that, according to the Government, established a rule that temporary flooding designed to protect the public interest was free of a takings examination in the courts. In short, they argued that the Government could indeed intentionally flood areas temporarily in order, for example, to facilitate flood control. In the Government’s understanding of this precedent, damage done to land was not compensable because it was done in the public interest of flood control (or other public works). Indeed, lawyers for the Government appear to have read one particular passage in the case as suggesting that, except when it could be shown that the flood was “the direct result of the structure,” and constituted a “permanent invasion of the land”, there could be no takings claim – whatsoever.

In reading the case law differently than the Government, Justice Ginsburg, intriguingly, points out that the precedent the Government relied on most heavily, Sanguinetti v. United States (264 US 316, 1924), predated cases that establish the contemporary jurisprudence on temporary takings (“Sanguinetti was decided in 1924, well before the World War II-era cases and First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 428 US 304 (1987), in which the Court first homed in on the matter of compensation for temporary takings. There is no suggestion in Sanguinetti that flooding cases should be set apart from the mine run of takings claims…” Slip Opinion, p. 2). This is intriguing because there is a long line of old precedents pre-dating contemporary jurisprudence that concern themselves specifically with flooding. Justice Ginsburg’s comment suggests that, perhaps, the Court would be willing to revisit others should industrious lawyers be able to argue that those cases are no longer in line with contemporary takings cases.

The Government also argued in their briefs that allowing takings claims in intentional flooding circumstances would result in the filing of takings claims that would make programs such as flood control difficult to implement. They suggested, as the Government often does, that accepting the plaintiff’s view would result in a slippery slope in which flood control and other programs would become all but impossible due to all of the takings claims made against them. Justice Ginsburg asserts that this is not the case:

“The slippery slope argument, we note, is hardly novel or unique to flooding cases. Time and again, in Takings Clause cases, the Court has heard the prophecy that recognizing a just compensation claim would unduly impede the government’s ability to act in the public interest,” (Arkansas Game and Fish Commission, Slip Opinion, p. 12). Indeed, citing a case in which the “slippery slope” argument was made in dissents, Justice Ginsburg pointedly comments, “The sky did not fall after Causby v. US (328 US 256, 1946) and today’s modest decision augurs no deluge of takings liability” (Slip Opinion, p. 12).

Why no deluge? Why wouldn’t the decision make flood control more difficult?

Well, first, takings clause cases are notoriously difficult to win. This is partly because, especially in instances where regulatory takings or temporary takings occur, it is very difficult to fully document what has been taken. This makes determining “just compensation” difficult. If the value of the land is completely wiped out, as required under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council (505 US 1003), it becomes easier to calculate what must be compensated. But anything less than a total wipe-out becomes difficult.

The Supreme Court has said that temporary takings can be compensated (Causby v US), and they certainly recognize the possibility that while title in land may remain with the original owner a regulation can create a taking (multiple cases on this point, but look at Pennsylvania Coal Co. for the beginning of the contemporary doctrine). The Court has also said that the decision of whether a taking occurred will depend upon “a complex of factors” designed “to prevent the government from ‘forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole,’” (Palazzolo v. Rhode Island (533 US 606, 2001), quoting Armstrong v. US (364 US 40, 1960)). In the reality of takings litigation, this means that the amount of detail required in the presentation of facts makes winning a takings case difficult (but not impossible).

What the justices did — unanimously — in Arkansas Game and Fish Commission v. US was provide the opportunity for plaintiff-owners whose land is intentionally flooded to show that their claims rise to the level of a takings claim through this intensive litigation process. Put another way, the Court has provided owners an opportunity to show that the all the factors, taken together, support the argument that they have been “bearing burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”

It is a high bar to pass, but one that is possible. As I have written elsewhere, takings litigation takes years, sometimes even decades, as it did with Palazzolo v. Rhode Island. It requires a patient plaintiff and industrious lawyers. Given the costs associated with these types of cases (experts being necessary to prove/disprove the claims, there’s often scientific studies of effects on land/terrain and ecosystems, etc.), most owners are not likely to file lawsuits, and lawyers are unlikely to take them on. Lower courts will vet the lawsuits for threshold issues first, and then for all of the facts in order to determine whether that “complex of factors” exists. It’s not an easy process for anyone. The cases that will make their way to decisions by judges or juries, or find their way into appellate courts, will likely be complex and unique. But these characteristics – complexity and uniqueness – are the hallmarks of most cases that make their way to final decisions and appellate courts. “Typical” disputes end early. “Difficult” disputes take a lot longer.

However, this litigation will be a bit of a pain for government lawyers. Had the Government prevailed in Arkansas Game and Fish, the lawyers who defend takings cases in the Justice Department would not have to worry about intentional flooding cases. It would have removed a set of cases and claims from their docket, providing them an easy way of getting rid of complaining owners. That, in turn, would have sent a message to those administrators involved in flood control and other wetlands policies that they did not need to worry about a judicial check on their activities. In a sense, then, the Court maintained its power just a little bit by making it clear that, whether plaintiffs will prevail or not, takings cases will remain within their purview. Checks and balances are maintained by Arkansas Game and Fish by maintaining the Court’s ability to decide a certain type of case.

The Fourteenth Amendment

So far in this series of posts I’ve discussed the various protections for property in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, and the Supreme Court’s first important decision touching on property. As I noted in that last post on Barron v. Baltimore, the primary enduring importance of Barron lies in the Court’s holding that the protections found in the Bill of Rights only limit the federal government, and not the states.

This all changed after the Civil War, when the Republican Congress made it a condition for the rebellious states’ reentry into the Union that they assent to certain amendments to the Constitution. These amendments, among other things, abolished slavery, declared that all people born in the United States are citizens (thus overturning the Court’s decision in Dred Scott v. Sanford), and stated that all citizens should equally enjoy the liberties and privileges that citizenship promises. [The full text of these amendments can be found here.] Today we’ll focus on the 14th Amendment, which has been central to the development of constitutional law and practice since its ratification.

Section 1 of the 14th Amendment reads, “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

These provisions fundamentally altered the nature of federalism in the United States – especially the Privileges or Immunities Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause. These clauses each asserted in their own way that the federal government would in fact protect the rights, privileges, and immunities of citizens in the United States – even against infringement from States. That is, these clauses seem to suggest that the federal constitution would henceforth protect individuals’ rights to speech, religion, bearing arms, voting, etc. from abuse by state and local governments.

In a series of important Supreme Court decisions in the decades after Reconstruction, including The Slaughterhouse Case, The Civil Rights Cases, and Plessy v. Ferguson, the reach of these Amendments was significantly limited. In these decisions, the Court held that the Privileges and Immunities Clause was basically null (Slaughterhouse), that segregation was admissible under the Equal Protection Clause so long as the separate facilities were “equal” (Plessy), and that racial discrimination by private individuals was beyond the reach of the 14th Amendment (Civil Rights Cases). These decisions have far-reaching implications though they don’t directly touch on our main interests here at DPP (if you’re interested, see the suggested reading below).

What is important here, without going into undue detail, is that 14th Amendment purported to extend significant federal power over states’ ability to infringe on individuals’ rights (especially the rights of newly freed slaves) – but the Supreme Court interpreted these new amendments in such a way as to mostly negate their immediate impact. Still, the 14th Amendment set the stage for the federalism revolution that the first Reconstruction Congress sought to affect. How this affected the law governing property rights will be the subject my next several posts in this series.

Suggested reading:

Ackerman, Bruce. 1998. We the People, Volume II: Transformations. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Amar, Akhil Reed. 1998. The Bill of Rights. Yale University Press.

Ely, James W. 2008. The Guardian of Every Other Right, 3rd ed. Oxford University Press.

Ely, John Hart. 1981. Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review. Harvard University Press.

Foner, Eric. 2002. Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877, 3rd edition. Harper Perennial Modern Classics.

Gillman, Howard, Mark A. Graber, and Keith E. Whittington. 2012. American Constitutionalism, Volume I: Structures of Government. Oxford University Press.

McCloskey, Robert G. 1960. The American Supreme Court. University of Chicago Press.

Valelly, Richard M. 2004. The Two Reconstructions: The Struggle for Black Enfranchisement. University of Chicago Press.